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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondenti
Case No,
14276

-vsRICHARD WAYNE WARD, aka
MORRIS GUTHRIE,
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Richard Wayne Ward, was convicted
in a criminal proceeding of aggravated robbery in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Richard Wayne Ward was tried and convicted by a
jury of aggravated robbery.

The appellant was sentenced

for a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison as
provided for by law.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the verdict of the
trial court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 2, 1975, at approximately 11:00 a.m.
an armed robbery was committed at the Thrifty Drug
Store, 4153 South 1700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The assailant was later identified by the drug store's
cashier as the appellant (Tr.76).

Appellant entered

the drug store on that warm July morning wearing a
jacket, heavy hunting hat, and gold rim sunglcisses.
The drug store cashier, Sharon Petersen, took special
notice of appellant's attire (Tr.70).

Appellcmt approached

the cashier's checkstand holding a multi-colored beach
towel, as if he intended to purchase it.
produced a silver colored nickle

Appellant then

plated revolver.

Pointing the revolver at the cashier, he directed her
to place the store's cash in one of the store's green
colored money bags.

The cashier placed approximately

$120.00 in the bag (Tr. 72,74).

As the appellant then

exited the store, Mr. Roger Arnold, a store customer,
observed appellant getting into a green automobile bearing
Texas plates (Tr.100).

Mr. Arnold wrote down the car's
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license number, which was then broadcast over the police
radio along with the general description of the automobile.
Officer Don Schindler received the description and
license number of the automobile and shortly thereafter
discovered the car in Murray, parked on State Street in front
of the Playmate Lounge (Tr.6).

Officer Schindler along with

another officer entered the Playmate Lounge looking for a
black male suspect, having received an erroneous description
of the suspect over the dispatch.

The officers noticed three

individuals sitting in a booth on the north side of the lounge
and several others around the pinball machines, but saw no black
individual (Tr.9).
The officers went in and out of the lounge twice
but again did not observe a black suspect. A later description
correcting the original mistaken one was broadcast describing
the suspect as a white male with dark bushy hair, long sideburns, and a deep tan (Tr.13).

With this revised description

the officers entered the lounge looking for the suspect.

The

officers observed a man fitting the description sitting alone
at the booth where there had once been two other men (Tr.15).
The officers approached appellant requesting his name and
identification.

Appellant produced a Texas driver's license.

-3-
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At this point officer Pederson informed appellant of his
constitutional rights (Miranda warning) (Tr.26), and
then proceeded to search appellant's person (Tr.26).
According to Officer Gary Pederson, appellant produced a set of car keys (Tr.27).

Then, according to Officer

Schindler, appellant denied ownership of the keys and
disclaimed ownership of the car (Tr.19).

Officer

Schindler also testified that appellant was asked if
he would mind if the officers checked to see if the keys
fit the vehicle and appellant that he would not mind
(Tr.20).
Officer Schindler then used the keys obtained
from appellant to unlock the door to the green automobile
(Tr.185).

Shortly thereafter the automobile was searched

without a warrant and a revolver, hunting cap, checkstand
bag, sunglasses, jacket and multicolored towel were seized
in the search.
The seized items were later identified by
State's witness Sharon Petersen as being those items
either worn or carried by appellant at the time of the
armed robbery (Tr.139-145).
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The trial court refused to suppress the evidence
removed from the green automobile bearing the Texas plates
and it is on the issue of the legality of the search and
seizure that appellant is appealing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN OBJECTION TO THE SEARCH OF THE GREEN
AUTOMOBILE BEARING TEXAS PLATES.
The issue of whether appellant has standing to
contest the legality of the search of the automobile
hinges on his claim of possessary or proprietary interest
in the automobile.

In State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38f

414 P.2d 958 (1966), this Court stated the rule for
determining standing to challenge an unlawful search or
seizure:
"In order for appellant to
have standing to raise the issue of
an unlawful arrest, the sole prerequisite is that he claim a proprietary or possessary interest in the
searched or seized property." Ic[. at
41.
Appellant contends that he meets both of these
requirements by coming before this Court and claiming a
proprietary or possessary interest in the automobile.
For appellant to have standing to make his Fourth
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Amendment claim, it is required that he not disclaim
ownership in the automobile at the time of the search.
In the case of United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 549
(4th Cir. 1976) , the defendant, when questioned by
federal agents, denied ownership of a briefcase and
typewriter case found lying on the floor of his motel
room.

The cases were seized and searched by the federal

agents.

The FourthCircuit Court of Appeals held as

follows:
"The record, however, shows
that defendant voluntarily
admitted the agents into his motel
room, disclaimed ownership of the
brief case and the typewriter case
and stated that he had no objection
to a search of the cases. His
disclaimer is analogous to abandonment and made the cases subject to
seizure." Id. at 550, 551.
Thus, United States v. Williams, supra, clearly
holds that in order for a defendant to have stemding to
claim Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search
and seizure he must not disclaim ownership in the
thing to be searched at the time the officer questions
him as to his interest therein.
The Court in Simpson v. United States, 34 6 F.2d
291 (10th Cir. 1965), held that defendant in possession
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of a stolen vehicle had standing to claim the car was
unlawfully searched and seized because his lack of
ownership was not established until after the search.
The Simpson case is distinguishable from this case in
that Simpson claimed a proprietary or possessary interest
in the car prior to the search, whereas appellant in the
instant case disclaimed such interest.
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960),
the Supreme Court held that Jones, convicted of possession
of narcotics, was not required to claim ownership of the
narcotics in order to have standing to question the validity
of the search and seizure.

To require a claim of ownership

would have forced Jones to allege facts sufficient to convict
him.

However, this is not true in the case before the

Court.

A claim of a proprietary or possessary interest in

the car on the part of appellant would not have been
sufficient to convict him of armed robbery.
Appellant therefore, in order to have standing
to raise an objection to the alleged unlawful search,had
to claim ownership interest in the automobile prior to the
search.

Having failed to do this, appellant lacks

standing to raise the objection at this time.
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POINT II
APPELLANT'S VALID CONSENT TO THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE RENDERS THE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE VALID.
Warrantless searches as a general rule are
invalid, unless they fall under one of the exceptions
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973), recognized a consent search as an
exception to the requirements of a search warrcint and
probable cause.
Appellant in the present case when asked by
police officers if he would mind their searching the
automobile with Texas license plates, did not object
to the warrantless search (Tr.188).
Appellant, prior to his consenting to the
search, had been given the Miranda warning (Tr.
26).

In Schoor v. State, Okl. Cr., 499 P.2d 450

(1972), the Court of Criminal Appeals for Oklahoma
recognized the validity of a consent to search
where the consent followed an appropriate Miranda
warning.

The Court said:
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" . . . if the proper Miranda
and Escobedo warnings are given
the defendant prior to interrogation
and he thereafter, voluntarily and
without coercion, gives permission or
consent to search, the same is a
constitutionally valid consent."
Id., at 456.
Appellant in the case before the court after
receiving the Miranda warning voluntarily consented
to the search of the automobile.
Appellant contends that having denied
ownership in the automobile, he thought he was
deprived of the right to refuse his consent. Again
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, the Supreme
Court held that knowledge of the right to refuse
consent was not a prerequisite to the State proving
a voluntary consent.

Id. at 249.

-9-
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Appellant further agrees that his consent to the
warrantless search was involuntary in that he had to choose
between disclaiming any interest in the automobile and
refusing the police permission to search the car.

Appellant

knew that his possessing a Texas drivers license and a
set of keys, which fit the automobile bearing Texas plates,
was sufficient to connect him with the automobile, regardless of whether appellant claimed an interest in the car.
For appellant to argue that his fear of being connected with
the automobile prevented him from claiming an interest in
the automobile, which in turn prevented him from refusing
his consent, does not make sense.

The fact that appellant

was so obviously connected with the vehicle would more
likely have made appellant refuse his consent in order to
prevent the discovery of the incriminating evidence.

The

facts of this do not support appellant's contention that
the consent was involuntary.

The Supreme Court again in

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, stated that:
"When the subject of a search is
not in custody and the State attempts
to justify a search on the basis of
his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate
that the consent was in fact voluntarily
given, and not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances."
Id. at 875.
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Appellant in the present case argues on the one
hand his disclaimer of ownership of the automobile and his
consenting to the search thereof, and then on the other
hand claiming he has a possessory or proprietary interest
in the car and claiming the consent to search was involuntarily
given.

In view of the obvious connection between appellant

and the automobile, the facts of the case support the holding
that appellant voluntarily consented to the search.
POINT III
THE SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT WARRANT DID
NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, IN THAT
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED TO WARRANT THE SEARCH ON
PROBABLE CAUSE.
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution requires
generally that a valid search warrant based on probable cause
be issued by a magistrate, prior to a search and seizure.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized certain
exceptions to this general rule.

The automobile exception

was first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1924).

The court held in that case that an automobile

transporting contraband could be searched without a warrant
when the search was based on probable cause.
Since Carroll, supra, the warrantless search of an
automobile has been held to be valid only when exigent
circumstances exist.

In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(1970), the Court explained what exigent circumstances
are sufficient to render a warrantless automobile search
valid.

In Chambers, supra, defendant and three others

were arrested on probable cause while driving in defendant's
car on a public road.

Defendant was taken into custody

and the car was taken to the police station.

The car

was later searched at the station without a warrant.

There

was no chance the defendant in that case would take flight
from the jurisdiction or remove the car from police custody.
The police could easily have obtained a search warrant but
instead conducted a warrantless search.

In holding the

search and seizure valid the Supreme Court stated:
"For constitutional purposes, we
see no difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to
a magistrate and on the other hand
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause
to search, either course is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." ]Cd. at 42 8.
Appellant argues that the required exigent circumstances to support a warrantless search are lacking in
the case at bar.

As authority appellant cites Coolidge v.

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where the Supreme Court
held a warrantless automobile search invalid.

The Coolidge,

supra, case is easily distinguished from the present case.
The automobile searched in Coolidge, supra, was not on
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public property, it was taken from the defendant's private
driveway.

The defendant, Coolidge, was also a resident of

the trial court's jurisdiction (not a transient).

In both

Chambers, supra, and the instant case, the automobiles
were searched and seized on public streets.

In the present

case, the appellant and the searched automobile were from
out of state.

These distinguishing facts were recognized

in United States v. Pollard, 466 F.2d 1

(10th Cir. 1972).

In Pollard, supra, the court distinguished the exigent circumstances in Coolidge, supra from those in Chambers, supra.
In Pollard, federal agents had probable cause to believe
defendant had attempted to burglarize a bank.

Defendant

was in his motel room away from his car with the car locked
in the motel parking lot.

In upholding the warrantless

search the court stated:
" . . . Pollard was a transient, of
sorts, hundreds of miles from his
home, with his vehicle parked just
outside his motel room and readily
available for a quick departure.
. . . Pollard's Buick was, in our
view, a 'fleeting target1 of the
type alluded to in Chambers and the
instant case presents exigent circumstances not present in Coolidge.
Accordingly, it is on this basis that
we find the search of Pollard's
Buick to be a lawful one." Id. at 5.
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The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Shields, 28 Utah
2d 405, 503 P.2d 848 (1972), upheld a warrantless automobile search under circumstances similiar to those
existing in Pollard, supra, and in the instant case.
In

Shields the driver of the searched vehicle was arrested

in a cafe with the car parked and locked on the street.
The police drove the car to the police station and there
conducted a warrantless search. The Utah Supreme Court
relied on Chambers, supra, in finding that exigent circumstances existed to warrant the search on probable cause.
Appellant in the present case was a trcmsient,
driving an out of state vehicle.
parked on a public street.

The automobile was

Other persons had been sitting

in the Playmate Lounge with appellant and possibly had
keys to the automobile.

Clearly exigent circumstances

existed to warrant the immediate search of the car.
CONCLUSION
Appellant lacks standing to claim Fourth Amendment
protection to the search and seizure, due to his failure
to claim a possessary or proprietary interest in the automobile at the time of the search.
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Assuming arguendo appellant has standing, the
warrantless search conducted by the police was made with
the consent of the appellant and was made upon probable
cause under exigent circumstances sufficient to render
the search valid.

Therefore, appellant's request for

reversal and remand should be denied.
Respectfully sybmitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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